Differential Inference Testing: A Practical Approach to Evaluate Sanitizations of Datasets by Kassem, Ali et al.
HAL Id: hal-02422992
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02422992
Submitted on 23 Dec 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Differential Inference Testing: A Practical Approach to
Evaluate Sanitizations of Datasets
Ali Kassem, Gergely Acs, Claude Castelluccia, Catuscia Palamidessi
To cite this version:
Ali Kassem, Gergely Acs, Claude Castelluccia, Catuscia Palamidessi. Differential Inference Test-
ing: A Practical Approach to Evaluate Sanitizations of Datasets. SPW 2019 - 40th IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy Workshops, May 2019, San Francisco, United States. pp.72-79,
￿10.1109/SPW.2019.00024￿. ￿hal-02422992￿
Differential Inference Testing: A Practical Approach
to Evaluate Sanitizations of Datasets
Ali Kassem
Inria
Grenoble, France
ali.kassem@inria.fr
Gergely A´cs
Crysys Lab, BME-HIT
Budapest, Hungary
acs@crysys.hu
Claude Castelluccia
Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Inria
F-38000 Grenoble, France
claude.castelluccia@inria.fr
Catuscia Palamidessi
Inria, E´cole Polytechnique
Univ. of Paris Saclay, Paris, France
catuscia@lix.polytechnique.fr
Abstract—In order to protect individuals’ privacy, data have
to be “well-sanitized” before sharing them, i.e. one has to remove
any personal information before sharing data. However, it is
not always clear when data shall be deemed well-sanitized.
In this paper, we argue that the evaluation of sanitized data
should be based on whether the data allows the inference of
sensitive information that is specific to an individual, instead
of being centered around the concept of re-identification. We
propose a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of different
sanitization techniques on a given dataset by measuring how
much an individual’s record from the sanitized dataset influences
the inference of his/her own sensitive attribute. Our intent is
not to accurately predict any sensitive attribute but rather to
measure the impact of a single record on the inference of sensitive
information. We demonstrate our approach by sanitizing two real
datasets in different privacy models and evaluate/compare each
sanitized dataset in our framework.
Index Terms—Sanitization, Inferences, Machine Learning, k-
Anonymity, `-Diversity, Differential Privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, organizations own large volumes of data about
individuals. Sharing those data provides several benefits for
both organizations and individuals. But, at the same time,
it puts individuals’ privacy at high risk. A straightforward
countermeasure to protect individuals’ privacy, known as
pseudoanonymization, is to exclude explicit identifiers such
as name, address, and phone number. However, it has been
shown that pseudoanonymization is not sufficient to protect
individuals’ privacy as the remaining information such as date
of birth, gender, and zip code can be used to re-identify
individuals [19], [20].
In order to provide more guarantees about individuals’
privacy, more sophisticated techniques have been proposed
to sanitize data from information that may lead to re-
identification. Examples of such sanitization techniques are
mechanisms that rely on data suppression and generalization
(known as anonymization techniques) [12], [16], [18], and
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those that rely on noise addition like in differential privacy [6].
Nevertheless, there is neither well-defined scheme to evaluate
the robustness of sanitization techniques, nor a clear under-
standing for “when data is regarded as well-sanitized”. The
European General Data Protection Regulation considers data
as properly sanitized (anonymized) if “data subject is no longer
identifiable”. A more specific approach can be found in the
Working Party 29 opinion on 05/2014 about “Anonymization
Techniques”, which considers the following three privacy
risks: “re-identification”, “linkability” and “inference”.
In this paper, we argue that inferences should be the primary
concern when it comes to individuals’ privacy. In particular,
we see identity disclosure as one way among others to infer
information about individuals. Actually, mitigating “identity
disclosure” is the primary goal of pseudoanonymization, how-
ever, it is not always relevant to data sanitization. Indeed, if
a dataset is “completely-sanitized”, then assigning an identity
to a certain record is pointless as the records will be highly
noised or aggregated. However, as far as the effectiveness of
sanitization is concerned, we should be aware about the precise
meaning of information inference as preventing any kind of
inferences usually lead to useless data [7]. Indeed, the ultimate
usefulness of a dataset is always to infer new information. So,
as a trade off between privacy and utility, sanitized data should
not allow the inferences of “private” information , but at the
same time, they have to allow the inference of some “public”
information about the population, i.e., the acquisition of any
generalizable knowledge. The acceptability or unacceptability
of an inference can be based on two criteria:
1) The basis of the inference: is the inference performed
on the records of one (or a small group of) individual(s)
or a large group of individuals. We will call these kinds
of inferences private and public, respectively.
2) The nature of the inference: can the inference be used
to discriminate users? Can it have a very negative (for
example social or financial) impact?
The intuition behind the first criterion is that if an adversary
cannot prove that the records of a user were used to generate
the inference, then, by definition, these records are “protected”.
Note that, it might happen that a model which is exclusively
built on population characteristics also accurately predicts
some sensitive information of individuals who are member
of this population [3]. However, we do not consider this to
be a privacy breach as long as the population, which is used
to build the model, is large enough. Instead, as in [15], we
believe that there are acceptable and unacceptable disclosures:
“learning statistics about a large population of individuals is
acceptable, but learning how an individual differs from the
population is a privacy breach”. For instance, inferring an
attribute value about the population of a large city, or a rule
like “a man smoking between 1 and 4 cigarettes per day is 3
times more likely to die from lung cancer than a non-smoker”
should be acceptable. But, deriving some information about
the inhabitants of a building may or may not be acceptable
depending on the number of people in the building.
As regards the second criterion, the inference nature is partly
subjective and involves ethical and legal considerations [7].
In this paper, we focus on the first criterion and propose a
framework called Differential Inference Testing to assess the
inference basis. Namely, we make the following contributions:
• We propose an inference-based framework that can be
used to evaluate the robustness of a given sanitized
dataset against a specific adversary that is modeled by
an inference algorithm (Section III). In particular, the
adversary builds a machine learning model in order to
infer an individual’s sensitive attribute from his publicly
known attributes in the sanitized dataset. We consider the
attack successful (and the data not ”well-sanitized”) if
the adversary obtains sufficiently different (but perhaps
inaccurate) results depending on whether the target in-
dividual’s record was used to train the model or not,
i.e., the output of the inference potentially leaks some
individual specific information aside from more general
population characteristics. Our approach is reminiscent of
Differential Privacy [6], however, it also differs from that
in several aspects that we detail in Section II-B. A key
feature of our testing procedure is that it needs to have
access only to the sanitized data itself and requires no
knowledge about the sanitization technique. Thus, it can
be used to assess datasets that are sanitized by organiza-
tions which may prefer not to disclose their sanitization
techniques. Even more, the verifier (e.g., Data Protection
Authority) of a sanitization process does not need to
understand or analytically analyze its privacy guarantees
which can be very tedious and error-prone [13].
• We use our framework to evaluate two datasets after being
sanitized in the k-anonymity, `-diversity, and differential
privacy (Section IV) models. In this paper, we consider
microdata, but our solution is general and can be applied
to any type of datasets, such as aggregated data.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Testing Data Sanitization
To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the first
one that proposes a general practical test to evaluate sani-
tized datasets by making distinction between acceptable and
unacceptable inferences. Yet, there are some prior related
works [1], [4], [5], [17].
The authors of [4] propose a framework to test whether a
machine learning (ML) model can predict sensitive attribute
values from a given sanitized dataset. But, they consider all
types of inferences as privacy breaches. More precisely, their
framework tests, for every record, whether the ML model can
predict the true value of the sensitive attribute. If the ML model
succeeds to predict the true value (what they call “empirical
utility”), then the sanitization technique does not pass the
test. Note that the framework does not consider whether the
prediction was obtained from the record of the target individual
(that was somehow poorly sanitized) or from the records
of other users (that happen to be correlated with the target
individual). By contrast, we propose a framework that does not
consider data utility (i.e., ignores the accuracy of inferences
in absolute sense), but instead tests whether an inference is
private (depends on the target individual) or public. In our
framework, a dataset is deemed “well-sanitized” if it can be
shown that, for any user, the resulting inferences based on this
dataset do not depend on the contribution of a single user but
on the contribution of all users together: the inference accuracy
should not change too much whether the user’s record is
included or not in the dataset. Such a dataset protects against
“private” inferences while still allowing “public” inferences.
Recently, [1] and [5] have proposed statistical techniques
to identify the violations of differential privacy. Unlike these
approaches, our method considers the sanitization technique as
a black-box and only requires access to the sanitized datasets.
This can be a favorable feature if the sanitization schemes are
proprietary and their exact operations are not published. Also,
our testing procedure is more general as it can be applied
beyond differential privacy.
Pyrgelis et al. [17] used machine learning for membership
inference on aggregated location data. They build a single
binary classifier to predict a given individual’s presence in the
sanitized data. By contrast, we follow a more general approach
and measure how much the inference of a particular sensitive
information/attribute is affected by a single individual’s data
using a specified distance measure. For this purpose, we
build two classifiers; one which predicts the sensitive attribute
using all the sanitized dataset and another one which uses the
sanitized data excluding the individual’s data, then report the
difference between the output of these classifiers according to
the chosen distance measure. Of course, we can easily turn
our approach into membership inference by combining the
output of the two models into a single binary classifier to
infer membership. However, the choice of different distance
measures allows to incorporate different privacy requirements
into our framework which makes our approach more general.
For instance, membership may be already publicly known, but
not some sensitive attributes.
B. Differential Inference Testing vs. Differential Privacy
Our approach is inspired by differential privacy [6]. Indeed
like differential privacy, it guarantees that the inferences one
can derive from a sanitized dataset are similar, whether or
not the record of a certain individual is included. However it
differs from differential privacy in several aspects:
• Our approach provides a method to measure the ro-
bustness of sanitized datasets, and to compare different
sanitizations of the same dataset. Differential privacy, on
the other hand, is a property of the sanitization scheme
and not of the sanitized dataset.
• For differential privacy to hold, the sanitization must
be done probabilistically (typically, by adding controlled
noise to the answer to the query). Our approach, on the
contrary, can also be applied to deterministic sanitization
techniques, like k-anonymity [18] and `-diversity [16].
• The possible inferences one can make in differential
privacy are strictly related to the query for which the
mechanism is defined without any further restrictions
on how the inference model is built. In our case the
inferences are produced by a machine learning algorithm,
which constitutes a parameter of the framework.
• In differential privacy the metric used to compare the
inferences in the dataset with and without a certain
individual is fixed and based on the upper bound to the
likelihood ration. In our setting, the comparison is based
on a parametric notion of distance between distributions.
• Differential privacy relies on tedious and error-prone
analytical analyses of the privacy guarantee, while our
approach uses easy-to-implement empirical evaluation of
a very similar (but weaker) guarantee [1], [14].
III. DIFFERENTIAL INFERENCE TESTING
In this section, we introduce the notion of indifferentiability
(Section III-A), then we propose a testing procedure in order
to evaluate the indifferentiability of a given sanitized dataset
against a certain inference model (Section III-B).
A. Model
Given a sanitized dataset, our approach tests whether the
inference of some sensitive attribute(s) is influenced by the
presence of any single individual in the dataset. If the
“amount” of this influence is large, then the inference leaks
some private information, i.e., any information that potentially
differentiates the individual from the rest. In this case, the
dataset is not sanitized properly. Conversely, smaller influence
indicates stronger sanitization. In order to measure such an
influence, we propose the notion of δ-indifferentiability de-
fined in Definition 1. Without loss of generality, we express
the sensitive attribute(s) to be inferred using a single attribute
S, which can be any function of other attributes. Note that,
the explicit distinction between quasi and sensitive attributes
is only for demonstration purposes. Moreover, we assume
that the contribution of every individual i to D is a single
record (qi, si) where qi represents his quasi-identifiers and si
represents his sensitive value.
Definition 1 (Indifferentiability): Let D be a dataset (Q,S)
where Q is a tuple of quasi-identifiers and S is a sensitive
attribute. Let D−i denote the dataset obtained from D by
removing the record (qi, si) of individual i. Let A be a
(possibly randomized) inference algorithm, and let f be a
sanitization technique. Let Mf(D) and Mf(D−i) denote the
random variables describing the output of the models Mf(D)
and Mf(D−i) which are built according to A respectively us-
ing f(D) and f(D−i) to provide each, given a quasi-identifier
tuple from Q, a prediction distribution over the domain of
the attribute S. We say that f(D) is δ-indifferentiable with
respect to A, if we have that
∀(qi, si) ∈ D, distance(Mf(D),Mf(D−i)) ≤ δ
where distance is a statistical distance measure.
Somewhat abusing the notation,M denotes both the model
and the random variable describing its output henceforth.
The evaluation of the sanitized dataset f(D) depends on
the value of δ. If δ is small enough (depending on the case
study) then, for every individual i in D, the inference about i’s
sensitive value does not strongly depend on the i’s record (i.e.,
public inference). On the other hand, for larger δ’s, there may
exist i’s in D such that the inference about the i’s sensitive
value depends on the i’s record (private inference).
Definition 1 does not consider any external knowledge about
i or D, however, it can be generalized in a straightforward way
to capture any such possible knowledge. For instance, in case
of Bayesian inference, auxiliary information can be used to
compute the prior probabilities, and thus favorizing one value
of the sensitive attribute over the others.
The inference algorithm A represents the adversarial strat-
egy to predict/infer the value of the sensitive attribute. The
choice of inference algorithm A depends on the case study
and is a task of the analyst. Indeed, the differentiability δ of
sanitized dataset f(D) depends on the considered inference
algorithm A. In this paper, we use Bayesian inference as an
inference algorithm for it is simplicity and popularity. Note
that, the aim of our framework is not to accurately predict
any sensitive attribute but rather to measure the impact of a
single record on the inference of sensitive information.
We note that Mf(D) and Mf(D−i) belong to the same
model family since they are built using the same algorithm A.
For instance, if Mf(D) is a neural network then Mf(D−i) is
also a neural network with the same architecture and with the
same hyper parameters, but with potentially different model
parameters as they are trained using two different training
datasets f(D) and f(D−i). In the rest of the paper, we may
use M and M−i to refer to Mf(D) and Mf(D−i), respec-
tively. Definition 1 assumes that the output of a modelM is a
vector of probability values, i.e., a prediction distribution on
the possible values of the sensitive attribute. Specifically, if
there are n possible sensitive values s1, . . . , sn, then for some
record (qi, si), M(qi) = {(s1, pi1), . . . , (sn, pin)} where pij
denotes M’s confidence that si = sj . In the rest of the paper,
we refer to the number of possible sensitive values by n, and
we write M(qi) = (pi1, . . . , pin) when the related sensitive
values are clear from the context. Similarly for model M−i,
we write M−i(qi) = (p−i1 , . . . , p−in ).
Finally, distance denotes a distance measure (such as total
variation distance, KL-divergence, etc.) chosen by the analyst.
The choice of distance should depend on the privacy require-
ments, and it fundamentally impacts the result of our approach.
B. Testing Procedure
We propose a procedure to find, given a sanitized dataset
f(D) and an inference algorithm A, the minimal distance δ
such that f(D) is δ-indifferentiable with respect to A (that
is the the minimal δ that satisfies Definition 1). In order to
perform the test, one should also have access to f(D−i) for
every (qi, si) ∈ D. Nevertheless, the sanitization technique
f itself is not needed by our testing procedure. The testing
procedure runs through the following steps:
1) Choose a record (qi, si) ∈ D for some individual i.
2) Use A to build two models M and M−i respectively
using datasets f(D) and f(D−i). For example, in the
case where A is a machine learning algorithm, then
f(D) and f(D−i) will act as training datasets.
3) Provide qi as an input to the modelM. The output ofM
takes values from the set of all prediction distributions
which corresponds to an n-dimensional simplex in Rn
(i.e., M(qi) = (pi1, . . . , pin) over the domain of the
sensitive attribute S, where
∑n
j=1 p
i
j = 1).
4) Repeat the last step for M−i whose output also takes
values from the set of all prediction distributions (i.e.,
M−i(qi) = (p−i1 , . . . , p−in ) over the domain of the
sensitive attribute S, where
∑n
j=1 p
−i
j = 1).
5) Compute the distance d i = distance(M,M−i).
6) Repeat Steps 1-5 for every individual i in D.
7) Return the maximal distance d i for every i ∈ D, as δ.
The outputs of M and M−i can be described by random
variables whose output range is the n-dimensional simplex in
Rn. Indeed, the sanitization algorithm f is a possibly ran-
domized black-box mechanism, which means that the output
distributions of Mi and M−i can only be approximated by
sampling. However, sampling from the n-dimensional simplex
is not scalable if n is large and/or there are many records in
D. Hence, in this paper, we rely on the following simplifi-
cation; we approximate the distribution of every coordinate
of the prediction distribution independently, and compare the
approximated distributions of the corresponding coordinates.
More precisely, for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let Pij and P−ij denote
the random variables describing the values of pij and p
−i
j , re-
spectively. Then, distance(M,M−i) = ∑nj=1 div(Pij ,P−ij ),
where div is a distance measure (or divergence) between
distributions. In this paper, we use the 1st Wasserstein dis-
tance (or Earth Mover’s Distance, shortly EMD) as such a
distance measure, that is, div(Pij ,P−ij ) = EMD(Pij ,P−ij ) =
infpi
∫
R
∫
R |x − y|dpi(x, y), where the infimum is taken over
all probability measures pi on R × R with marginals Pij and
P−ij . Intuitively, EMD measures how far one has to move the
probability mass of Pij to turn it into P−ij , where ”farness”
between the values of Pij and P−ij is measured by their
absolute distance1. We approximate the empirical measures of
1EMD permits different “farness” measures other than the absolute differ-
ence |x−y|. We chose this metric due to its simplicity and fast computation.
Pij and P−ij and compute the EMD between these empirical
measures (see [2] for details). In particular, if xi1, . . . , x
i
N and
x−i1 , . . . , x
−i
N denote the samples taken from the distributions
of Pij and P−ij , respectively, then EMD(Pij ,P−ij ) can be
approximated by:
EMD(Pˆij , Pˆ−ij ) =
1
N
N∑
k=1
|xi(k) − x−i(k)| (1)
where Pˆij and Pˆ−ij denote the empirical measures of Pij and
P−ij , respectively, and xi(k) denote the kth order statistic (kth
smallest value) of samples xi1, . . . , x
i
N (analogously to x
−i
(k)).
We use EMD as it makes randomized and deterministic
sanitizations comparable in our framework. In particular, the
uncertainty of the adversary has two sources; one is measured
deterministically by the inference algorithm and represented
by the prediction confidences of each sensitive value in its
output. The second source of uncertainty stems from the
”artificially” introduced perturbation in the sanitization process
(e.g., by the Laplace Mechanism in differential privacy) which
induces a probability distribution on these (deterministic)
confidences. Unlike traditional divergences like total variation
distance or the max-ratio distance used in differential privacy,
EMD also considers the value of the inference algorithm’s
output and not only the distribution of these values.
Example. Consider the dataset presented in Table Ia. It has two
quasi-identifier attributes: “Age” (an integer) and “Gender”
(M:Male or F:Female), and a sensitive attribute: “Disease”
which can take two values (Flu and Cancer). Table II rep-
resents a 2-anonymous version of this dataset (as every record
is syntactically indistinguishable from at least another record
considering their quasi-identifiers)2.
TABLE I: Original dataset, and related result.
(a) Dataset.
# Age Gender Disease
1 28 M Flu
2 36 M Flu
3 47 F Cancer
4 53 M Flu
5 72 F Flu
(b)M(qi),M−i(qi), and d i.
# M(qi) M−i(qi) di
1 (1, 0) (1/2, 1/2) 1
2 (1, 0) (1/2, 1/2) 1
3 (2/3, 1/3) (1, 0) 2/3
4 (2/3, 1/3) (1/2, 1/2) 1/3
5 (2/3, 1/3) (1/2, 1/2) 1/3
Let i denote the individual that corresponds to record 4 from
Table Ia. If we know that i is a 53 years old male, then we
can infer from Table IIa the following prediction distribution
about his disease: Pr[Flu | (53,M)] = 23 and Pr[Cancer |
(53,M)] = 13 , i.e., M(q4) = {(Flu, 23 ), (Cancer, 13 )}, as
(53,M) belongs to the second equivalence class of Table IIa
which is composed of the last three records (Step 3). Notice
that we used a very simple inference algorithm A here for
simplicity (i.e., computing the probability of a sensitive value
conditioned on the values of all the quasi-identifiers), though
one can use any sophisticated inference model in practice.
2 In our example, the sanitization technique f is k-anonymity [18].
Now, if we remove the 4th record from the original dataset
(Table Ia) then apply 2-anonymity we obtain Table IIb. It is
important to remove the record from the original dataset before
applying sanitization again. Hence, the new sanitized dataset
f(D−4) (after removing the record) can be different from the
first sanitized dataset f(D) (obtained by sanitizing the whole
original dataset). The prediction distribution after removing the
4th record is M−i(q4) = {(Flu, 12 ), (Cancer, 12 )} (Step 4).
Finally, considering EMD distance, then d i =
distance(M4,M−4) = distance(M(q4),M−i(q4)) =∑n
j=1
∣∣p4j − p−4j ∣∣ = 13 (Step 5) since M(q4) and M−i(q4)
are the only possible output of M and M−4, respectively
(i.e., the sanitization scheme is deterministic). After repeating
the previous steps for every record in the dataset (Step 6),
the maximal distance δ = max
i∈D
d i can be computed (that is
the the minimal distance that satisfies Dentition 1), which is
δ = 1 = max{1, 1, 23 , 13 , 13} in our example. Table Ib depicts
the distributions M(qi),M−i(qi) and the distance di for
every record i in the dataset of Table Ia.
Notice that using a different distance metric the results
can completely change. For example, if distance denotes the
total variation distance (TVD), then distance(M4,M−4) =
distance(M(q4),M−i(q4)) = 1 + 1 = 2 which suggests that
the data is blatantly non-private as distance(Mi,M−i) ≤ n
for any i.
TABLE II: 2-anonymous versions of Table Ia.
(a) f(D) (with i = 4).
# Age Gender Disease
1 < 45 M Flu
2 < 45 M Flu
3 ≥ 45 {M, F} Cancer
4 ≥ 45 {M, F} Flu
5 ≥ 45 {M, F} Flu
(b) f(D−4) (without i = 4).
# Age Gender Disease
1 < 45 M Flu
2 < 45 M Flu
3 ≥ 45 {M, F} Cancer
5 ≥ 45 {M, F} Flu
IV. EVALUATION
A. Datasets
We demonstrate our approach using two datasets: the UCI
Adult (Census Income) dataset3 and the “General Demograph-
ics” dataset from Internet Usage data4. Table III summarizes,
for each dataset, its size (|D|), number of distinct record
(|D†|), quasi-identifiers (QI), and sensitive attribute (SA) as
well as the number of values that SA can take (n).
TABLE III: Datasets description.
Dataset Adult Internet Usage
|D| 10,000 9,799
|D†| 7,960 7,049
QI
“age”, “education” “age”, “race”
“marital status” “education attainment”
“hours per week” “major occupation”
“native country” “marital status”
SA “occupation” “household income”
n 14 9
3https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
4http://www.cc.gatech.edu/gvu/user surveys/survey-1997-10
B. Sanitization
For sanitization techniques, we consider the basic Mondrian
k-anonymity [9], Mondrian `-diversity [10], and data pertur-
bation required to satisfy differential privacy [6].
1) k-anonymity and `-diversity: The Mondrian sanitization
algorithm modifies the records by generalizing the quasi-
identifiers until each record becomes syntactically indistin-
guishable from k − 1 other records (k-anonymity), or the
correct sensitive value of any individual cannot be predicted
with probability more than 1/` (`-diversity)5. After being gen-
eralized, the data is then published with the related sensitive
values.
2) Differential Privacy: As for differential privacy, noisy
statistics of the microdata are computed which are then used
to compute the prediction distribution of each record. In
particular, contrary to k-anonymity and `-diversity, differen-
tial privacy provides weak utility when it is directly ap-
plied on microdata. Instead of generating sanitized microdata,
the differentially private prediction distributions M(qi) and
M−i(qi) are directly computed from the original dataset, and
these distributions are compared in Step 5 of the Differential
Inference Test described in Section III. In other words, our
differential private sanitization technique f is coupled with a
simple inference algorithm A that we describe below.
The sanitization technique f consists of releasing the
perturbed conditional probabilities Pr[s|q] for all sensitive
attribute value s and value of quasi-identifier tuple q. These
conditional probabilities are directly used as the prediction
distributionsM(qi) andM−i(qi) in our Differential Inference
Test (see Section III). Specifically, in order to obtain the dif-
ferential private prediction distributions M(qi) and M−i(qi)
for a quasi-identifier tuple qi = (qi1, . . . , q
i
m), we compute
Pr[sk|qi] = Pr[sk, q
i]
Pr[qi]
(2)
In Eq. (2), we calculate the joint probability Pr[sk, qi] as
Pr[sk, q
i] =
Cik∑
i
∑
k Cik
(3)
and the marginal probability Pr[qi] as Pr[qi] =
∑
k Pr[sk, q
i]
where Cik = 1 +max(0, |{(q, s) ∈ D : q = qi ∧ s = sk}|+
noise) and the noise is drawn from the Laplacian distribution
L(0, 1/) with zero mean and variance 2/2. This perturbation
technique is also referred to as the Laplace Mechanism in the
literature of differential privacy6. Note that the addition of 1
to Cik is the standard Laplacian correction in order to avoid
zero value of the denominator in Eq. (3).
The privacy guarantee of differential privacy comes from
the randomness of the Laplace Mechanism; if the variance of
the added noise is larger, we have stronger guarantee (i.e.,
smaller ε), and the reverse direction holds for small variance.
Differential privacy is formally defined in Definition 2.
5Using only f(D) as a background knowledge for inference.
6The scale parameter of the Laplace noise is adjusted to the global
sensitivity of the counts Cik which is 1 in our application.
Definition 2 (-differential privacy [6]): A sanitization algo-
rithm f guarantees -differential privacy if for any database D
and D′, differing on at most one record, and for any possible
output O ⊆ Range(f), e− ≤ Pr[f(D)∈O]Pr[f(D′)∈O] ≤ e.
In our case, the range of f is the space of all prediction
distributions (i.e., vectors from an n-dimensional simplex), and
an output O of f is a random vector from this space.
C. Pre-processing
Many sanitization techniques (such as Mondrian) generalize
the attribute values according to a specific generalization hier-
archy. In order to feed the learning algorithm with generalized
data in our experiments, we use an encoding mechanism that
is relative to the target record selected in Step 1 of our
testing procedure (see Section III-B) and works as follows:
a generalized quasi-attribute value q′ (e.g., an interval or set)
is represented by 1, if the corresponding quasi-attribute value
q′′ of the target record can also be generalized to q′ (i.e., q′′
is inside q′ if q′ is an interval, or q′′ is a member of q′ if it is
a set). Otherwise, q′ is represented by 0.
For example, consider the two generalized records:
r1 = ([15, 25],Female, {France,Germany}) and r2 =
([17, 20],Male, {Italy,Germany}). Assuming that the target
record, which is selected in the first step of our testing
procedure, is rt = (16,Male,France), then r1 and r2 will be
encoded as follows: encode(r1, rt) = (1, 0, 1) because 16 ∈
[15, 25], Male 6= Female, and France ∈ {France,Germany}.
Similarly, encode(r2, rt) = (0, 1, 0) because 16 /∈ [17, 20],
Male = Male, and France /∈ {Italy,Germany}.
An advantage of this encoding technique is that it depends
on the target record which will be used as an input for the
inference model. This may increase the sensitivity to the pres-
ence of the target record in the dataset, and thus help to better
capture the difference between the two intended distributions.
Another advantage of this approach is that it is very fast
to compute and has to be done only once for each record
(other approaches may require different encodings of the same
record for the computation ofM andM−i). Nevertheless, any
encoding mechanism can be used in our framework as long
as the encodings of each record is sufficiently different from
that of the target record.
D. Differential Inference Test
1) Inference algorithm: For the purpose of inference A
and the computation of the prediction distributions M(qi)
and M−i(qi), we use a Naive Bayes classifier7 in the case
of k-anonymity and `-diversity, and the noised conditional
probabilities in Eq. (3) in the case of differential privacy. In
both cases, the inference algorithms use the encoded sanitized
data to build the models M and M−i. The Naive Bayes
classifier has been used by several prior works [3], [4], [11]
to perform inference on sanitized data. Although Naive Bayes
makes the simplistic assumption that the quasi-identifiers are
independent, it usually performs remarkably well, especially
when the size of the training dataset is not so large.
7We use the Bernoulli Naive Bayes from the sklearn python module.
After choosing the encoding mechanism and the inference
algorithm, we proceed according to the Differential Infer-
ence Test described in Section III-B: for every record ri
in the dataset, we train a model M where D includes ri,
and also train another model M−i where D−i excludes ri.
Then, the corresponding two prediction distributions of M
and M−i are approximated by sampling, and the distance
d i = distance(M,M−i) is computed for every i. Finally,
we obtain the minimal distance δ that satisfies Dentition 1,
i.e., δ = max
i∈D
d i. In what follows, “minimal δ” refers to the
minimal distance δ that satisfies Dentition 1.
We emphasize that the (in)differentiability of a sanitized
dataset depends on the inference algorithm A, which repre-
sents the adversarial algorithm to infer sensitive information
from the dataset. This is in stark contrast to differential
privacy, which provides the same guarantee (i.e., the same
 value) against all inference algorithms. On the other hand,
(in)differentiability (in Definition 1) can be empirically eval-
uated unlike differential privacy (in Definition 2) which relies
on analytical evaluation that is often tedious and error-prone.
E. Results
1) k-anonymity and `-diversity:
a) Adult Dataset: Figure 1 depicts the minimal δ (that
satisfies Dentition 1 in the case of Adult dataset) depending on
the privacy parameter (k or `). The cases of k = 1 and ` = 1
implies the absence of sanitization, i.e., the testing procedure
is applied directly on the original data without any sanitization.
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Fig. 1: Minimal δ (Adult data).
From Figure 1, we can notice that:
• δ is smaller for `-diversity than for k-anonymity when k
and ` have identical values. This is expected as, unlike k-
anonymity, `-diversity was designed to mitigate inference
attacks, though not the same type of inference that we
measure in our approach. Specifically, `-diversity ad-
dresses the absolute accuracy of inferences. By contrast,
we focus on the relative accuracy of inferences.
• δ decreases when the privacy parameter (k or `) increases,
however not monotonically. For instance, counterintu-
itively, the minimal δ increases when k increases from
8 to 16 and when ` increases from 2 to 3.
The second observation above shows that increasing the value
of the privacy parameter may decrease the privacy guarantees
against private inferences for some individuals (worst-case
privacy), even if the guarantees on average (average-case
privacy) can be stronger. In particular, Figure 2 presents the
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of d i. The CDF is the
sum of the relative frequencies for all values that are less than
or equal to the given value of d i. Figure 2 shows that, for
both k-anonymity and `-diversity, the majority of d i values
are smaller for larger k or `. The CDF illustrates the level
of the average-case privacy, which increases if the value of
the privacy parameter also increases (as one could expect for
k-anonymity and `-diversity). This emphasizes the fact that
average-case privacy, which is usually adopted by companies
and governments’ regulations, does not always imply worst-
case privacy, which is considered in our framework. Indeed,
Dentition 1 has to be satisfied for every record in the dataset.
A closer investigation reveals that there are only few outlier
records with large value of d i when ` = 3 or k = 16. For
example, when ` = 3, there is only one record ri whose d i
value is greater than 10−1 (for this record, d i = 0.21), which is
the minimal δ in this case. Similarly, for 16-anonymity, there
are only 3 outlier records which have much larger d i values
than others.
In order to achieve stronger sanitization (smaller δ), we
remove the outlier records identified above from the original
dataset, then repeat the entire testing procedure to compute a
new value of minimal δ (remember that it is not sufficient to
remove the outlier records only from the sanitized dataset).
For ` = 2, we obtain the following new values of minimal
δ: 0.165 for ` = 2 and 0.092 for ` = 3, what one naturally
expects when ` increases.
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Fig. 2: CDF of d i (Adult data).
b) Internet Usage Dataset: Figures 3 and 4 present the
minimal δ and the CDF of d i, respectively, for the Internet
Usage dataset. The results confirm the conclusion that average-
case guarantees against private inferences often differs from
the worst-case guarantees in practice due to the existence
of a few outlier records with much worse privacy guarantee
than the average. However, on average, increasing the privacy
parameters k and ` results in stronger guarantee against private
inferences using the Mondrian sanitization scheme.
2) Differential Privacy:
a) Adult Dataset: Figure 5 presents the CDF and δ for
the Adult dataset in the case of differential privacy (DP). We
quantized the “age” and “hours per week” attributes, each, into
5 quantiles. This results into 2952 distinct records (instead of
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Fig. 3: Minimal δ (Internet Usage data).
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Fig. 4: CDF of d i (Internet Usage data).
7960) out of 10K records.  = ∞ corresponds to the case
when no Laplace noise is added to the counts in Eq (2).
We performed N = 25K samples per record in order
to have an estimate of the prediction distribution for every
individual. From these noisy predictions, we can compute the
minimal δ (in Figure 5a) as it is described in Section III-B. The
minimal δ curve shows that smaller  indeed yields stronger
protection, for every individual, against private inferences, as
δ is monotonically decreasing with  as one would expect.
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Fig. 5: CDF and δ (DP, Adult data, N = 25K).
b) Internet Usage Dataset: Figure 6 presents the CDF
and δ for the Internet Usage dataset. Again, we have quantized
the “age” attribute into 5 quantiles. This results into 2926
distinct records (instead of 7049) out of 9799 records.
The CDF and minimal δ curves (in Figure 6) show sim-
ilar trends to the Adult dataset and confirm our observation
that, for every individual, smaller  yields stronger protection
against private inferences.
Finally, we note that, for both datasets, the values of δ are
smaller for k-anonymity and `-diversity on average than for
differential privacy (Figures 1, 3, 5, and 6). Hence, differential
privacy even with  = 0.1 may provide weaker protection on
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Fig. 6: CDF and δ (DP, Internet Usage data,
N = 25K).
average against private inferences if we use the EMD distance
measure defined in Eq. (1), but it is worst-case guarantee is
superior to k-anonymity and even to `-diversity if ` < 5.
3) Computation time: All the experiments that are pre-
sented above were conducted on a machine with a 2.6 GHz
Intel Core i7 Processor and 16 GB RAM. Table IV summarizes
the average computation time of the differential inference test
per privacy parameter (excluding the raw data case, i.e., where
k = ` = 1 and  = ∞). Note that the computation can be
substantially improved since the sanitizations of the dataset
(per user) are highly parallelizable.
TABLE IV: Average computation time.
Dataset k-Anonymity `-Diversity Differential Privacy
Adult data 60m 24s 76m 6s 5h 41m 51s
Internet data 47m 30s 50m 12s 4h 23m 22s
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presents an inference-based framework to eval-
uate the effectiveness of sanitization performed on a given
dataset. In particular, we empirically measured how the san-
itized dataset prevents the private inferences of sensitive at-
tribute values. We demonstrated the usage of this framework
on two datasets. Our framework allows to compare different
sanitized datasets that might use different privacy models,
such as k-anonymity, `-diversity or differential privacy. It
can potentially be employed by companies or DPAs (Data
Protection Authorities) to test the robustness of sanitized
datasets. It is important to note that our solution tests the
robustness of sanitized datasets, not that of the underlying
sanitization technique.
Our case study shows that `-diversity and k-anonymity can
provide stronger average protection against private inferences
in our framework than differential privacy if  is chosen to be
too large. This result should be handled with caution, since
these techniques have quite different adversary models and
some attacks which are hard to be modeled using a machine
learning algorithm in our framework can have devastating
effect on `-diversity and k-anonymity yet still difficult to
launch against a differentially private dataset [8]. In particular,
our model considers only a specific adversarial inference
attack as well as some potentially defined extra background
knowledge of the adversary. We also showed that increasing
the value of k and ` results in stronger protection on average,
but can also entail weaker worst-case guarantee when each
individual is considered.
We believe that there is a need for a toolkit to test the
robustness of sanitized datasets by implementing different re-
identification or inference attacks. Our framework could be
one component of such a toolkit. One benefit of the proposed
testing tool is that the sanitized dataset is analyzed as a
“black box”, i.e. the sanitization algorithm does not need to be
published. It is enough for the verifier to get access to an oracle
that, given a dataset, outputs its sanitized version. We believe
this is a desirable property for at least two reasons: (i) many
companies are unwilling, for different reasons, to publish their
sanitization algorithms, and (ii) the verifier does not need to
go through the difficulty of understanding and analyzing the
underlying algorithm.
In the proposed framework, the verifier can use his favorite
inference models. This paper uses a Naive Bayes classifier,
but other classifiers could be used. Evaluating our framework
with other classifiers is part of our future work.
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